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Low pay poses issues for managers internationally. We examine productivity in low-
paying sectors in Britain, since the introduction of the NationalMinimumWage (NMW).
We use a multiple channel analytical strategy, emphasizing the wage incentives chan-
nel and linking it to a model of unobserved productivity. We estimate ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity measures and aggregate them to the level of low-paying sectors. Difference-
in-differences analysis illustrates that the NMWpositively affected aggregate low-paying
sector productivity. These ﬁndings highlight increased wage incentive effects with implica-
tions for management practice and public policy since ‘living’ wages may be productivity
enhancing.
Introduction
We examine the impact of the National Mini-
mum Wage (NMW) on productivity, building on
the British Journal of Management’s ﬁrst virtual
edition: Employee responses to changing work
practices (Frynas and Croucher, 2015). Managing
wages at the bottom of the distribution and the
relationship between efficiency and equity are in-
creasing concerns for managers and governments
internationally. Debates around the recent intro-
duction of a national minimum wage in Germany,
discussions of the level of state and federal minima
in the USA, calls for a European minimum wage
and low pay concerns in multinational corpora-
tion supply chains pose signiﬁcant issues for man-
agers. So, too, do British calls for organizations
voluntarily to implement ‘living wages’ (Atkinson,
2015). Meanwhile, productivity concerns preoc-
cupy British commentators (Atkinson, 2015). Yet
evidence on the minimum wage−productivity
link is scarce and inconclusive. Existing studies
(e.g. Croucher and Rizov, 2012; Galindo-Rueda
and Pereira, 2004; Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene,
2015) use labour productivity measures and in-
dustry level data (Forth and O’Mahony, 2003).
The NMW’s impact on total factor productiv-
ity has not previously been explicitly studied with
micro data. However, some recent indirect evi-
dence onwages, employment and proﬁts in theUK
(Bernini and Riley, 2016) and case studies in the
USA (Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska, 2015) sug-
gest that minimum wages may raise total factor
productivity.
In the UK, the impact of minimum wages
on ﬁrms has commonly been studied from neo-
classical perspectives. Wage increases raise ﬁrms’
marginal costs, inducing them to reduce mark-ups
(e.g. Draca, Machin and Van Reenen, 2011;
Galindo-Rueda and Pereira, 2004; Riley and
Rosazza-Bondibene, 2015), making ﬁrms appear
less productive. However, ﬁrms experiencing
high factor costs may pass some on as higher
output prices, fully compensating for mark-ups
(Wadsworth, 2010). The extent of labour market
competition also has important implications for
input prices and productivity (Dickens, Machin
andManning, 1999; Machin andManning, 1994).
For large (monopsonistic) ﬁrms, minimum wages
can reduce marginal costs, increasing demand for
labour and in turn increasing output and, possi-
bly, productivity. In competitive labour markets,
minimum wages will bring higher costs; capital-
for-labour substitution would be the prevailing
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adjustment mechanism, leading possibly to pro-
ductivity improvements (Machin and Manning,
1994). Clearly, neo-classical models’ predictions
depend on assumptions inﬂuenced by market
conditions.
We investigate the issues from an alternative, be-
havioural stance.1 Several early theoretical studies
on the implications of efficiency wages link wage
increases and higher productivity (e.g. Lazear,
1981; Salop, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
In related but more behaviourally focused frame-
works, Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
and Levine (1991) argue that perceived reciprocity
and fairness affect workers’ productivity. Fair
wage−effort theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990)
suggests that when workers receive less than the
wage they ‘deserve’, they reduce effort. In de-
termining their ‘fair wage’, individuals compare
themselves with others dependent on market con-
ditions, resulting in relative reductions in wage dif-
ferentials. Levine (1991) argues that reducing wage
dispersion can increase work team cohesiveness,
promoting productivity.We use these arguments in
developing our analytical strategy.
The UK’s introduction of the NMW constitutes
a relevant natural experiment. We propose that
introducing a minimum wage improved incentives
and thus productivity either through efficiency
wage mechanisms or by aligning real and fair
wages. We model the link between total factor
productivity (TFP) and the NMW in a novel
way using a structural productivity estimation
approach based on Olley and Pakes (1996). Pre-
vious studies relating productivity to the NMW
employ a two-step analysis where in the ﬁrst step
productivity is estimated without controlling for
the NMW’s effects and then, in a second step,
the NMW’s association with the productivity
measures is analysed. The productivity measures
estimated in the ﬁrst step are likely to suffer from
omitted variable bias. Our approach explicitly
models the unobserved productivity and directly
incorporates the effects of the NMW into an inte-
grated semiparametric estimation algorithm. Our
analysis therefore generates robust empirical evi-
1Lester (1960) offered the ﬁrst institutional-behavioural
explanation of minimum wage effects on labour market
outcomes. Kaufman (2010) and Hirsch, Kaufman and
Zelenska (2015) extend Lester’s ideas, proposing a mul-
tiple channels of adjustment approach.
dence on the relationship between the introduction
of the NMWand improved productivity over time.
Selective literature review
Numerous studies on minimum wage effects use
neo-classical economics models. Effects on em-
ployment and wage distributions have been exten-
sively studied in the USA (e.g. Card and Krueger,
1994, 1995; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996;
Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska, 2015; Katz and
Krueger, 1992; Lee, 1999; Slonimczyk and Skott,
2012) and in the UK (e.g. Dickens, Machin and
Manning, 1999; Georgiadis, 2013; Machin and
Manning, 1994, 2004; Machin, Manning and
Rahman, 2003; Metcalf, 2002, 2008; Riley
and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2015; Stewart, 2002,
2004). Consensus exists that the overall effect on
employment is neutral and accompanies (modest)
wage distribution compression. Recently, Bernini
and Riley (2016) and Hirsch, Kaufman and
Zelenska (2015) both concluded that minimum-
wage-induced adjustments through channels
identiﬁed by neo-classical models are relatively
insigniﬁcant. They suggest that institutional-
behavioural models could have more explanatory
power.2 Grimshaw (2013) advances similar views.
Therefore, our focus is on wage incentive effects,
which have been central in identifying sources of
increasing productivity at ﬁrm and wider economy
level. Economists have developed efficiency wage
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and labour extraction
function (Bowles, 1985) models, where wages and
monitoring levels are traded off to elicit work-
ers’ effort.3 Wages are set above the market clear-
ing wage, creating incentives for increased worker
effort due to the increased opportunity costs of
ﬁnding another job.4
2Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska (2015) argue that all
three main labour market models (competitive, monop-
sony and institutional-behavioural) capture important el-
ements regarding adjustment effects, making comparison
and empirical discrimination difficult.
3Georgiadis (2013) tests a shirkingmodel within efficiency
wage theory by studying the NMW’s impact on the UK’s
care home industry. In his framework theNMWgenerates
an increase in the average wage in an organization which
results in reduced supervision costs, and by implication
increased productivity.
4Unemployment has been seen as a crucial component
of the efficiency wage incentive scheme to work. How-
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Another related but theoretically distinct set
of models posits that social norms and compar-
isons are important for workers. In Akerlof (1982),
workers and employers create implicit gift ex-
change relationships, which are more valuable for
incumbent workers and employers than external
options, thus inducing higher effort and produc-
tivity. Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) model is par-
ticularly relevant for low paid contexts: through
comparisons with a reference group, workers con-
ceive of a fair wage, which if above the actual
wage results in reduced effort and productivity;
at wage levels above the fair wage no productiv-
ity effect arises. Their argument draws on observa-
tions of behaviour consistent with psychologists’
equity theory (Adams, 1963) and sociologists’ so-
cial exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961).
In both theoretical constructs, equity notions are
crucial and are generally strongly empirically sup-
ported. When workers perceive their wages as fair
they are more proactive and willing to participate
in company affairs (Levine, 1993). Perceived fair-
ness in the presence of appropriate group norms
promotes labour force cohesiveness and synergies
(Beal et al., 2003; Cartwright, 1968) potentially
producing monitoring savings.
Selecting the most appropriate reference group
in a perceived fairness/equity comparison remains
a contested endeavour. Using equity theory
(Adams, 1965) as the underlying framework
requires individuals to decide if they are being
rewarded equitably by comparing their inputs and
outputs with those of others. Here, both rewards
and productive contributions matter. Relative
deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959)
proposes a referential framework based only on re-
wards comparisons. The implications for suitable
reference groups are quite different. Following
equity theory, employees compare themselves
with similarly skilled and productive individuals,
whereas relative deprivation theory suggests that
individuals are sensitive to pay differentials with
dissimilar groups. Reconciling these theories in the
context of a large set of occupations, Dornstein
(1988, p. 233) stipulates that employee compar-
isons are made ‘ﬁrst and foremost with those in
ever, Brown, Falk and Fehr (2012) show that even without
unemployment the incentive structure remains effective.
Higher wages induced by competition for labour bring
higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity – a chan-
nel suggested by Akerlof (1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984).
the same or in similar occupations outside the
organization’. This ﬁnding reﬂects high sensitivity
towards overall market trends in pay.5 In the
case of low paid workers in Britain, dual labour
market theory also suggests that workers in the
‘secondary’ segment are strongly oriented towards
external labour markets (Riley and Szivas, 2003).
Empirical studies conﬁrm the proposition (May
et al., 2010).
Another complexity arising from within-ﬁrm
reference groups derives from information (sig-
nals) effects of wage comparisons, which may be
stronger than comparison (status) effects. Simply
put, in such a scenario we would expect that work-
ers are happier the more others earn, i.e. the more
wages are dispersed. Some studies have indeed
uncovered a positive well-being effect from others’
income (e.g. Clark, Kristensen and Westergard-
Nielsen, 2009; Kingdon and Knight, 2007; Senik,
2004). Potentially counter-intuitive, this ﬁnding
has been explained by reference to Hirschman’s
tunnel effect (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973),
which stipulates that others’ good fortunes create
expectations in observers. Clearly, such arguments
apply to occupations with steep wage proﬁles and
are less relevant to low pay sectors where career
progression prospects are limited. Thus, fair wage
considerations arguably rely more on status than
on signal effects. The balance between status and
signal is driven by the strength of the correla-
tion between a reference group’s income and a
worker’s future earnings. As Clark, Kristensen
and Westergard-Nielsen (2009) suggest, at oc-
cupational peer group or geographical level, the
correlation is expected to be small. A discernible
status effect is thus arguably far greater when
reference groups within the same ﬁrm are avoided.
Both efficiency and fair wage theories have
important implications for market equilibrium.
Efficiency wage theory implies higher wages paid
by ﬁrms to targeted worker groups. If ﬁrms are
heterogeneous there will be a distribution of
wages where ﬁrms that ﬁnd shirking particularly
costly will offer higher wages to identical workers
than other ﬁrms (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
5Experimental literature often considers ‘vertical’ com-
parisons, between workers and employers (see Fehr,
Goette and Zehnder, 2009); however, the importance of
‘horizontal’ comparisons is recognized (e.g. Bartling and
von Siemens, 2011; Clark and Senik, 2010) as suggested
by Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
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Nevertheless, depending on labour market con-
ditions (unemployment levels, monitoring costs,
turnover) efficiency wage theory motivates right-
ward shifts in the ﬁrm wage distribution. Fair
wage−effort theory in turn implies wage distri-
bution compression (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990;
Levine, 1991), which would usually also be asso-
ciated with increases in the average wage. If ﬁrms
must pay a high wage to some workers – perhaps
those in short supply – pay equity demands will
raise wages for other workers in the ﬁrm.6
Both theories suggest that some market inter-
ventions could be Pareto efficient. In the context
of their efficiency wage model, Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984, p. 434) argue that ‘in some circumstances
wage subsidies are desirable’, e.g. to curtail exces-
sive labour turnover. To maintain egalitarianism
and cohesiveness ﬁrms must also pay an efficiency
wage to the lower end of their wage distribution
to reduce the ﬁrm wage differential. Left to the
market, these higher wages will be under-provided
in equilibrium. Levine (1991) concludes that poli-
cies affecting either prices (e.g. minimum wage) or
quantities (e.g. labourmobility restrictions) can in-
crease efficiency in economies.
The NMW’s bite
Our analytical strategy comprises two stages – esti-
mation and validation. First, we estimate ﬁrm level
(total factor) productivity based on the Olley and
Pakes (1996) semiparametric algorithm, modiﬁed
to directly account for the NMW incentive effects
while controlling for technology, input decisions,
selection and market conditions. Second, we ap-
ply commonly used difference-in-differences anal-
ysis to validate and illustrate NMW effects on pro-
ductivity and, to facilitate interpretation, on wages
and capital−labour ratios at the level of individual
low-paying sectors.
Identiﬁcation at the productivity estimation stage
We ﬁrst identify the NMW’s observable bite on
wage distributions at ﬁrm and industry levels.
6Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2005) show that temporary in-
troduction of a minimum wage brings rises in subjects’
reservation wages, which persist after the minimum wage
has been removed. Thus, economic policy may affect be-
haviours by shaping perceptions of fair transactions and
creating entitlement effects.
Next, we directly account for the effects through a
measure of the bite in the production function es-
timation algorithm, controlling for other technol-
ogy and market factors. We thereby capture ceteris
paribus the NMW’s incentives driven effects on
(total factor) productivity.
To identify the effects we use data for aver-
age wages at ﬁrm level.7 The NMW’s bite ob-
served as an averagewage increasemay derive from
three channels as discussed by Lee (1999) who for-
mally models the relationship between the mini-
mum wage’s bite and observed wage distributions
in the USA. First, there may be no spillovers and
no disemployment, which represents the censoring
case. The only NMW effect is to raise the wages
of those initially earning less than the minimum,
implying compression of the wage distribution. A
second channel is characterized by spillovers but
no disemployment, occurring when the NMW af-
fects higher percentiles; at the (unlikely) extreme,
theremay be nowage distribution compression but
a rightward shift of the whole distribution. A third
channel represents truncation: no spillovers but full
disemployment. Here, the NMW has no impact
on workers with wages already above the mini-
mum and causes job loss for those earning below
it, implying wage distribution compression. Any of
these channels or a combination would lead to an
observed increase in the average ﬁrmwage. Clearly,
the (net) incentives effect obtained would conﬁne
‘standard’ efficiency wage and fair wage forces.8
The effect’s magnitude depends on the initial
ﬁrm wage distribution. For ﬁrms for which shirk-
ing is costly and which have unilaterally opted to
pay higher wages, the NMW’s impact on the aver-
age ﬁrmwagewould be negligible. TheNMW’s im-
pact on the average wage in ﬁrms where the share
of low pay workers is minimal will also be negligi-
ble. These inferences have important implications
for the industry wage distribution’s behaviour.
Clearly, at industry level, on NMW inception (or
upgrading), there will be larger increases in low
wage ﬁrms’ average wages, on the distribution’s left
7We use the large FAME data rather than more detailed
private micro surveys. FAME is a large and highly rep-
resentative dataset for ﬁrms in UK industries. A detailed
description of FAME is provided in the section Data and
estimation results.
8To separately identify efficiency wage and fair wage ef-
fects we need information on unavailable within-ﬁrm
wage distributions.
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side.9 Compression of the industry wage distribu-
tion from below will result. We measure the extent
of the compression, which represents the observed
NMW’s bite following Lee (1999), through the
tenth−ﬁftieth percentile (log) wage differential.
There are two important advantages in consid-
ering the industry (average ﬁrm) wage distribu-
tion in deriving our measure of the NMW’s bite.
First, the compression of the industry wage distri-
bution will capture both efficiency and fair wage
effects within ﬁrms. Further, for low paid workers
who have ﬂat wage proﬁles and predominantly rely
on horizontal comparisons, the appropriate refer-
ence group would be the industry median. Thus,
the compression of the industry wage distribution
would capture an important incentives effect at oc-
cupational level, as suggested by fair wage−effort
theory. Second, by considering average wages rel-
ative to the industry median we can control for
general, industry-wide wage shifts driven by non-
NMW factors.10
We indeed observe sectoral wage compression
from below in our data.11 We calculate disper-
sion measures at homogeneous units formed
at four-digit SIC industries and the Low Pay
9Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2011) identify stronger
NMW effects in lower average-wage ﬁrms compared with
higher average-wage ﬁrms. They verify that the threshold
of £12,000 is appropriate for the UK (FAME) sample by
extensively experimenting with the threshold cut-off and
examining segregation and averagewages in an alternative
dataset−WERS.We also tested the relationship between
average wage change and initial average wage in 1995−96
and 1998−99 and found, similar to Draca, Machin and
Van Reenen (2011) and Machin, Manning and Rahman
(2003), that in the earlier period the relationship was of-
ten insigniﬁcant while around the NMW implementation
period it was negative and signiﬁcant. Our results at low
pay sector level are available on request.
10An important condition for the median wage change
being a good control for non-NMW factors is that the
NMW does not impact the median. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the condition holds and studies for the USA
(e.g. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999)
and the UK (e.g. Draca, Machin and Van Reenen, 2011;
Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003) demonstrate that
the spillovers from the NMW on the (occupational) wage
distribution are limited to the area around theNMW level
and do not exceed the median.
11We have checked the evolution of the ﬁftieth−ninetieth
percentile of (log) wage differentials over time for all low
pay sectors and found that these were stable suggesting
that the NMW’s impact did not spill over beyond the low
pay segment. These results are available from the authors.
Commission’s (LPC’s) ﬁrm size groups.12 Table 1
summarizes dispersion measures for the LPC
sectors with high NMW incidence and two com-
posite counterfactuals for manufacturing (M)
and services (S), respectively. Since its 1999 intro-
duction, the NMW has increased in real terms
and we, like others, ﬁnd this is associated with
reduced wage dispersion throughout the period;
the reduction is very signiﬁcant over the ﬁrst three
years for several LPC industries. For the majority
of LPC industries no evidence of such reduction
in dispersion existed before 1999.
Identiﬁcation at the veriﬁcation stage
We verify and illustrate the NMW’s impact on
aggregate productivity by difference-in-differences
analysis. We identify treatment and control groups
of ﬁrms within the low pay sectors based on av-
erage wage information from FAME. Athey and
Imbens (2006) show that when the distributions of
treatment and control groups are the same a simple
means difference-in-differences estimator is consis-
tent. In selecting ﬁrms for our treatment and con-
trol groups we are guided by this condition, which
implies that for the control group to constitute a
valid counterfactual two equivalent conditions −
common trends and a stable composition of the
two groups – must be satisﬁed (Blundell et al.,
2004). Furthermore, we followDraca,Machin and
Van Reenen (2011) who used the same dataset and
conducted extensive robustness analysis of the two
conditions. We replicated Draca, Machin and Van
Reenen (2011)’s tests with our data and conﬁrmed
the trends and counterfactuals; the test results are
available from the authors.
The treatment group (T = 1) includes low wage
ﬁrms with an average annual wage of less than
£12,000 over the three years prior to the NMW’s
introduction in April 1999. The control group
(T = 0) contains similar ﬁrms but with an aver-
age annual wage between £12,000 and £24,000,
close to our samples’ median ﬁrm wage.13 Firms
with higher average wages are quite different and
12To better control for factors such as market conditions,
work group norms, labour management practices and
compliance, we divide our sectoral samples by ﬁrm size
into large, medium and small categories.
13Several studies on the NMW’s impact on ﬁrms using
FAME data, notably Draca, Machin and Van Reenen
(2011) and Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene (2015), apply
similar identiﬁcation strategies and select the cut-off point
© 2016 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
824 M. Rizov, R. Croucher and T. Lange
T
ab
le
1.
N
M
W
an
d
te
nt
h−
ﬁf
ti
et
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
s
of
lo
g(
w
ag
e)
di
ff
er
en
ti
al
s
by
L
P
C
se
ct
or
s
T
en
th
−ﬁ
ft
ie
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
lo
g(
w
ag
e)
di
ff
er
en
ti
al
s
Y
ea
r
N
M
W
,£
So
ci
al
ca
re
R
et
ai
l
H
os
pi
ta
lit
y
C
le
an
in
g
Se
cu
ri
ty
H
ai
rd
re
ss
in
g
T
ex
ti
le
s
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
F
oo
d
pr
oc
es
s
L
ei
su
re
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
lM
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
lS
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
19
96
–
−0
.7
6
−0
.8
0
−0
.8
2
−1
.0
1
−0
.8
6
−0
.5
7
−0
.8
0
−1
.0
0
−0
.7
5
−1
.0
2
−0
.3
8
−0
.8
8
19
97
–
−0
.7
8
−0
.7
8
−0
.8
4
−1
.0
2
−0
.8
5
−0
.6
6
−0
.9
0
−1
.0
2
−0
.7
6
−1
.0
0
−0
.3
6
−0
.9
2
19
98
–
−0
.7
6
−0
.7
7
−0
.8
2
−1
.0
6
−0
.8
4
−0
.5
8
−0
.8
2
−0
.9
6
−0
.7
5
−1
.0
2
−0
.4
2
−0
.9
0
19
99
3.
90
−0
.7
7
−0
.7
5
−0
.7
5
−1
.0
2
−1
.0
7
−0
.5
9
−0
.7
8
−0
.9
0
−0
.6
7
−0
.9
6
−0
.4
1
−0
.9
4
20
00
3.
97
−0
.7
5
−0
.7
2
−0
.7
1
−0
.9
6
−0
.9
5
−0
.5
2
−0
.7
0
−0
.9
1
−0
.5
8
−0
.9
2
−0
.4
3
−0
.9
5
20
01
4.
35
−0
.6
8
−0
.6
4
−0
.6
2
−0
.8
4
−0
.7
4
−0
.5
6
−0
.6
3
−0
.9
0
−0
.4
5
−0
.9
2
−0
.4
5
−0
.9
6
20
02
4.
40
−0
.6
8
−0
.6
0
−0
.5
7
−0
.7
9
−0
.5
9
−0
.5
4
−0
.5
9
−0
.8
8
−0
.3
8
−0
.8
9
−0
.4
2
−0
.9
5
20
03
4.
65
−0
.6
7
−0
.6
0
−0
.6
1
−0
.7
7
−0
.7
0
−0
.4
4
−0
.5
2
−0
.8
7
−0
.3
7
−0
.8
8
−0
.4
8
−0
.9
4
20
04
4.
95
− 0
.6
0
−0
.6
1
−0
.5
8
−0
.8
2
−0
.7
0
−0
.4
8
−0
.5
0
−0
.8
7
−0
.3
6
−0
.8
9
−0
.4
6
−0
.9
8
20
05
5.
05
−0
.6
2
−0
.6
2
−0
.6
0
−0
.8
7
−0
.7
1
−0
.5
4
−0
.5
1
−0
.9
2
−0
.4
0
−0
.9
3
−0
.4
5
−0
.9
7
20
06
5.
23
−0
.6
4
−0
.6
3
−0
.5
8
−0
.8
6
−0
.8
0
−0
.5
8
−0
.5
1
−0
.9
1
−0
.4
4
−0
.9
2
−0
.4
2
−0
.9
8
20
07
5.
27
−0
.6
1
−0
.6
5
−0
.5
8
−0
.8
5
−0
.8
4
−0
.5
7
−0
.5
5
−0
.8
5
−0
.4
0
−0
.9
2
−0
.4
5
−1
.0
0
20
08
5.
28
−0
.5
3
−0
.6
4
−0
.6
1
−0
.8
6
−0
.7
4
−0
.5
7
−0
.6
0
−0
.7
7
−0
.3
7
−0
.8
9
−0
.4
5
−1
.0
0
N
ot
e:
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
lM
co
m
pr
is
es
th
e
no
n-
L
P
C
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
in
du
st
ri
es
co
un
te
rf
ac
tu
al
an
d
co
un
te
rf
ac
tu
al
S
th
e
no
n-
L
P
C
se
rv
ic
e
in
du
st
ri
es
co
un
te
rf
ac
tu
al
.
therefore subject to different unobserved trends
compared to the treatment (and control) group
ﬁrms. We expect that wages of ﬁrms below the
cut-off point will experience a signiﬁcant boost
from the NMW introduction relative to higher
wage ﬁrms. Furthermore, we evaluate effects be-
fore (NMW = 0) and after (NMW = 1) the NMW
introduction, in an aggregate of all LPC sectors,
separate aggregates of manufacturing and service
sectors, and by individual LPC sectors; detailed re-
sults are available on request. Thus, the uncondi-
tional difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator of
the impact of the NMWon aggregate productivity
(TFP) is
DiD = (TFPT=1NMW=1 − TFPT=1NMW=0
)
− (TFPT=0NMW=1 − TFPT=0NMW=0
)
(1)
To facilitate interpretation of results we also ap-
ply equation (1) to aggregatewages (ln(w)) to verify
the NMW’s impact on the sectoral wage distribu-
tion and to aggregate capital−labour (K/L) ratios
to examine possible technology adjustments as an
alternative source of productivity change.
Furthermore, we also create alternative manu-
facturing (M) and services (S) sector composite
counterfactuals outside the low pay sectors where
ﬁrms are probably unaffected by the NMW’s in-
troduction. This additional analytical dimension
supports our conclusions.
Model of productivity and estimation
algorithm
Following the productivity literature summarized
in Ackerberg et al. (2007) we ﬁrst specify a
Cobb–Douglas production function
Yjt = jt
(
Lβljt , K
βk
jt
)
(2)
where j and t indicate ﬁrm and time, respectively.Y
represents output (oftenmeasured as value added);
L and K represent the common inputs used in pro-
duction, labour and physical capital respectively.
The β values are the factor shares of the produc-
tion inputs. The index jt is a measure of the TFP
of £12,000 after experimenting with different cut-offs.
In this analysis, we also experimented with £10,000 and
£14,000 cut-offs .The results were qualitatively similar al-
beit less pronounced.
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of ﬁrm j at time t. Olley and Pakes (1996) formulate
a model of the (unobserved) TFP as a function of
the ﬁrm’s state variables (capital K and age A) and
a control variable (investment I), which is mono-
tonically related to unobserved productivity. The
model is derived by inverting the ﬁrm investment
demand function, which is a solution to the ﬁrm
proﬁt maximization problem.
Following our identiﬁcation strategy and mod-
elling ideas developed in Ackerberg et al. (2007),
we extend the Olley−Pakes TFP model with
the wage dispersion measure NMWit (i denotes
industry-ﬁrm-size units) constructed as discussed
in the section Identiﬁcation at the productivity es-
timation stage, capturing the NMW’s incentives
impact on ﬁrm productivity. The wage dispersion
here acts as a second control variable which, as
discussed above, should be inversely (and mono-
tonically) associated with unobserved productiv-
ity. Market environment characteristics that the
ﬁrm faces are also controlled for by a vector R,
containing geographical, sector and time-speciﬁc
effects. The TFP model becomes
 j t = f j (Kjt, Ajt, Ijt,NMWi t, R) (3)
The original Olley−Pakes formulation allows
market environment factors to change longitudi-
nally, although they are assumed constant across
ﬁrms in a given period. Here, we extend the model
by using an explicit measure of the NMW’s incen-
tives impact on ﬁrms and a vector of other market
environment controls. Thus, the information con-
tent of the state space would vary by narrowly de-
ﬁned location and ﬁrm size group within four-digit
SIC industries and longitudinally. Since we deﬂate
value added and capital with industry-wide deﬂa-
tors, introducing market environment controls in
the TFP model helps control for the fact that out-
put and factor prices might differ across ﬁrm types
and/or evolve differently longitudinally.
The treatment of the TFP leads to an estimating
equation of the production function resembling
a multilevel modelling approach. Following Olley
and Pakes (1996), we estimate a log-linear trans-
formation of the Cobb−Douglas production func-
tion (equation (2)), incorporating the TFP model
(equation (3)):
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + βl ljt + ωjt + ηjt (4)
Small letters represent the respective variables’ nat-
ural logarithms; β coefficients represent the elastic-
ity of output (value added) with respect to inputs;
ω j t is unobserved productivity and η is the (iid) er-
ror term. As in Olley and Pakes (1996), we include
ﬁrm age in the speciﬁcation, to control for man-
agerial and technology differences, and cohort ef-
fects on ﬁrm productivity, which improves the co-
efficient estimates’ precision.
Because productivity ω j t (as deﬁned in equation
(3)) is not observed directly in the data, estimating
equation (4) is affected by simultaneity and selec-
tion biases. Simultaneity means that if more pro-
ductive ﬁrms tend to hire more workers because
of higher current and anticipated future produc-
tivity, an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
will provide upwardly biased estimates on the in-
put coefficients. Selection occurs because exit de-
pends on productivity as well as on state variables
(capital and age). Thus, the coefficient on capital is
likely to be underestimated by OLS as higher capi-
tal stocks allow ﬁrms to survive at lower productiv-
ity levels, implying a negative relationship between
capital and ω j t (Olley and Pakes, 1996).
To control for these biases, Olley and Pakes
(1996) developed a two-stage semiparametric es-
timation algorithm using a non-parametric con-
trol function of productivity. Following Olley and
Pakes, equation (4) can be re-written as
yjt = β0 + βkkjt + βaajt + βl ljt
+ ht(ijt, nmwit, r, kjt, ajt) + ηjt (5)
In equation (5) the productivity function ωjt =
ht(.) is treated non-parametrically using a polyno-
mial (we use a third-degree polynomial through-
out). The non-parametric treatment, however,
results in collinearity and requires the constant,
kjt and ajt terms to be combined into a func-
tion ϕt(i j t, nmwi t, r, kjt, a jt) such that equation (5)
becomes
yjt = βl ljt + φt(ijt, nmwi t, r, kjt, ajt) + ηjt (6)
Equation (6) represents the ﬁrst stage of the esti-
mation algorithm and is estimated by OLS.
In the ﬁrst stage, only the labour coefficient is
identiﬁed while capital and age coefficients are
identiﬁed in the algorithm’s second stage. An
© 2016 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
826 M. Rizov, R. Croucher and T. Lange
estimate φˆ j t is also obtained for use in the second
stage where ωjt is expressed as
ωˆ j t = φˆ j t − β0 − βkkjt − βaa jt (7)
The ﬁrst stage is unaffected by endogenous selec-
tion because the function φt fully controls for the
unobservable affecting ﬁrm’s choices; by construc-
tion η j t represents unobservable factors unknown
by the ﬁrm when making investment and exit deci-
sions. In contrast, the estimation algorithm’s sec-
ond stage is affected by endogenous selection be-
cause the exit decision in period t depends directly
on ωjt.
To clarify the timing of production decisions,
ω j t can be decomposed into its conditional ex-
pectation given the information about productivity
known by the ﬁrm in the t − 1 period and a resid-
ual: ω j t = E[ω j t|ω j t−1] + ξ j t = g(ω j t−1) + ξ j t. By
construction, ξ j t is uncorrelated with information
in t − 1 and thus with kjt and ajt which are deter-
mined prior to time t. The ﬁrm’s exit decision in
period t depends directly on ω j t and thus the de-
cision will be correlated with ξ j t.14 To account for
endogenous selection on productivity the g(.) func-
tion can be extended with survival information.
ω j t = g′(ω j t−1, Pˆjt) + ξ j t (8)
where Pˆjt is the survival propensity score which
controls for the impact of selection on the expec-
tation of ω j t, i.e. ﬁrms with lower survival propen-
sity which survive to time t probably have higher
ω j tvalues than those with higher survival propen-
sity. Pˆjt is estimated semiparametrically using a
probit model with a polynomial approximation.
The capital and age coefficients are identiﬁed in
the algorithm’s second stage. Equations (8) and (7)
are substituted into equation (5) leading to
yjt −
	
β
l
ljt = βkkjt + βaajt + g′(φˆjt−1 − βkkjt−1
−βaajt−1,
	
P
jt
) + εjt (9)
where the two β0 terms have been encompassed
into the non-parametric function g′(.) and ε j t is
14This correlation assumes that ﬁrms exit the market
quickly, in the same period as the decision is made. If exit
was decided in the period before actual exit then, although
there is attrition per se, exit would be uncorrelated with ξ j t
and there will be no selection bias.
a composite error term composed of η j t and ξ j t.
The lagged φˆ j t−1 variable is obtained from the ﬁrst
stage estimates at the t − 1 period. Equation (9)
is estimated by a non-linear least squares (NLLS)
search routine approximating g′(.) with a polyno-
mial.
In sum, in the algorithm’s ﬁrst stage we estimate
the labour coefficient βˆl by OLS while the capital
βˆk coefficient (as well as the age coefficient) is es-
timated in the second stage by NLLS. We use the
production function coefficients βˆk and βˆl consis-
tently estimated to back out unbiased ﬁrm-speciﬁc
TFP measures, calculated as
TFPjt = ωjt + βaajt + ηjt
= yjt − βˆkkjt − βˆl ljt (10)
Our TFP measure captures the NMW’s effects
on ﬁrm productivity while accounting for possi-
ble technology changes through capital for labour
substitutions and selection due to ﬁrm exits.
Data and estimation results
Data
We estimate the production functions speciﬁed
above using the FAME dataset, covering all ﬁrms
ﬁled at Companies House. Information on ﬁrm
level ﬁnancial statements, remuneration costs,
ownership structure and location is used. The data
contain annual records for over 360,000 ﬁrms,
for the period 1995−2008. The data’s coverage
is highly representative compared to aggregate
statistics for the industries analysed as reported
by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS);
for employment, it is approximately 82%. The
sectors analysed are identiﬁed following LPC
groupings of low-paying industries at the four-
digit SIC level. We also create counterfactuals
from manufacturing and service non-LPC indus-
tries: composites of a set of four-digit industries
identiﬁed in the Labour Force Survey and WERS
as having high levels of pay, high employee skills,
high unionization and hence minimal use of the
NMW in-company, as evidenced in successive
LPC reports.15 All nominal monetary variables
15The four-digit industries included in the counterfactuals
came from the following two-digit SIC industries: 23, 27,
29, 33, 34, 35, 40 for the manufacturing counterfactual
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are converted into real values by deﬂating with the
appropriate four-digit SIC deﬂators taken from
ONS. We use the Producer Price Index to deﬂate
sales and materials costs and asset price deﬂators
for capital and ﬁxed investment variables.
We seek to estimate an unbiased and consistent
TFP measure at ﬁrm level, capturing the NMW’s
incentive effects and to document the evolution of
aggregate productivity. The strategy implies run-
ning regressions within all four-digit low-paying
and counterfactual industries. After lags are ap-
plied and missing values deleted, over 160,000 ob-
servations remain. The estimated samples within
individual LPC sectors account for between 52%
and 70% of employment. The correlations between
the ONS aggregate statistics series and the esti-
mated sample series are sales –0.90 to 0.96, em-
ployment –0.90 to 0.97. Descriptive statistics cal-
culated from the estimated FAME samples within
LPC sectors and the counterfactuals are reported
in Table 2.
Productivity estimation results
Table 3 summarizes the aggregated coefficients on
labour and capital for LPC sectors and the non-
LPC counterfactuals. The aggregated coefficients
are weighted averages of the estimated industry co-
efficients using numbers of employees as weight-
ings. Differences exist across LPC sectors with
respect to capital and labour elasticities, especially
between manufacturing and services. The coeffi-
cient on labour ranges between 0.50 and 0.94 and
is highest in service industries. The capital coeffi-
cient ranges between 0.09 and 0.30 and is lowest in
social care and leisure.
Table 3 also reports means of the aggre-
gated productivity measure calculated from
the Olley−Pakes (TFP) models and a labour
productivity measure; the two appear broadly
comparable. The sectors with highest aggregate
productivity by the TFP measure are security and
retail; social care shows the lowest productivity.
Our TFP estimates are designed to capture the
NMW’s productivity impact. A simple way to
demonstrate this is to calculate elasticities of pro-
ductivity with respect to the NMW longitudinally
for the aggregate of LPC sectors, for separate ag-
and 64, 65, 66, 67 for the services counterfactual. In se-
lecting counterfactuals, we were guided by Labour Force
Survey and LPC statistics in estimating NMW exposure.
gregates of manufacturing and service sectors and
by individual LPC sector. We ﬁnd that the NMW
had a positive impact on aggregate productivity in
low-paying sectors. The elasticity of aggregate pro-
ductivity with respect to the NMW is around 1;
the productivity of service sectors is twice as sensi-
tive as that of manufacturing to NMW increases;
across individual LPC sectors substantial hetero-
geneity exists (see Table 3, bottom row). The high
impact in services may derive from the greater pro-
ductivity signiﬁcance of labour rather than capital
inputs in those industries.
Difference-in-differences analysis
Given our strategy to control for all relevant fac-
tors at the productivity estimation stage, we obtain
ﬁrm-speciﬁc TFP measures that capture all rele-
vant effects. Therefore, we follow an unconditional
difference-in-differences approach (equation (1))
and the identiﬁcation strategy described above,
which is similar to several otherNMWstudies. The
difference-in-differences results are reported in Ta-
bles 4−6. In each table’s ﬁrst three rows we verify
for all samples (total sample aggregate A, manu-
facturing M and services S) that compared to T =
0 wages rise by more in T = 1, after 1999. Stronger
wage effects exist for the treatment groups. In addi-
tion, we note our results on the changes over time
in the magnitude of sectoral tenth−ﬁftieth per-
centile wage differentials reported in Table 1, show-
ing a decline after 1999. The two results suggest
that potential effects on productivity of the treat-
ment group ﬁrms can be attributed to the NMW’s
bite, creating in-ﬁrm signiﬁcant incentive effects.
To check the robustness of our results we also
use counterfactuals (A, M and S) containing ﬁrms
from (non-LPC) industries where the NMW’s bite
is weak and where therefore effects on wages and
productivity will also probably be weaker. The em-
pirical ﬁndings conﬁrm our expectations.
Results for the NMW’s TFP effects are reported
in the second three rows of Tables 4−6.16 Our ﬁnd-
ings are consistent across individual LPC sectors,
for which the results are available from the au-
thors. Firms in the treatment groups experienced
relative increases in productivity during the period
1999–2008. The effects are statistically signiﬁcant
16The results by Croucher and Rizov (2012) based
on labour productivity measures are similar to those
reported.
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in all sectors except hairdressing, leisure and
agriculture. In these industries, compliance levels
are comparatively low as they employ high pro-
portions of women and (undocumented) migrant
workers shown to be especially susceptible to
under-payment and to worker−employer com-
plicity in that regard (Bloch and McKay, 2015;
Ipsos MORI, 2012; LeRoux, Lucchino and
Wilkinson, 2013). Besides, the non-effect in
agriculture is probably due to the Agricultural
Wage Board’s wage-ﬁxing throughout the period
of investigation. The largest relative increases in
productivity are in large ﬁrms in the aggregated
total and in the aggregated service sector samples.
In manufacturing, relative productivity increases
are also large for medium-size ﬁrms.
In Tables 4−6, third set of three rows, we
report the capital−labour (K/L) ratio. Changes
in the ratio may reﬂect technology adjustments,
which can be seen as alternative and long-term
NMW effects. In estimating our TFP measure
we control for technology changes (and survival
bias). In hospitality and social care, productivity
improvements indeed appear to be affected by sub-
stitution of capital for labour to a higher degree
compared with other LPC, mostly manufacturing,
sectors. For the aggregate services sample, some
evidence exists of substitution of capital for
labour in low-paying sectors while in the non-LPC
counterfactual sample such evidence is absent.17
An alternative explanation is ﬁrm exit. In Table
2, we reported exit rates by LPC sector for 1998,
2002 and 2008, i.e. just before, three and nine years
after NMW implementation. Over the ﬁrst three
years, exit rates do not seem to change compared
to 1998. By 2008, however, in sectors with relative
productivity gains where capital for labour substi-
tution is weaker, exit rates were somewhat higher,
apparently supporting the argument that less pro-
ductive ﬁrms exit in the long run. In estimating our
TFP productivity measure we control for survival
bias.
17In a short-run (robustness) analysis, covering
2000−2002, we found the capital for labour substitution
effect was much weaker and statistically insigniﬁcant,
while increases in wages and productivity in the treatment
groups were signiﬁcant albeit smaller in magnitude than
in the long run. These ﬁndings are consistent with Falk,
Fehr and Zehnder’s (2005) experimental ﬁnding that
introducing a minimum wage creates persistent impacts
on reservation wages and employment.
© 2016 The Authors British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Conclusion
We empirically evaluated the NMW impact on
ﬁrm and sector productivity using a multiple
channel of adjustment analytical framework,
emphasizing the behavioural perspective. Our
analytical strategy was to account for the NMW’s
impact on incentives and productivity, recognizing
that multiple channels generate the net effect,
controlling for factors identiﬁed by previous
studies. Previous studies did not account for the
NMW’s impact in the productivity estimation
algorithm. Our contribution is that while oth-
ers have analysed proﬁtability (Draca, Machin
and Van Reenen, 2011) and wages, employment
and labour productivity impacts (e.g. Riley and
Rosazza-Bondibene (2015)) from neo-classical
viewpoints, we show the value of a behavioural
and broader social science theoretical perspective
in addressing productivity effects. We thereby
conﬁrm and demonstrate the incentives created by
the NMW suggested by Bernini and Riley (2016)
and Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska (2015) to be
an important channel of adjustment.
We show improvements in TFP in low-paying
sectors after 1999. We also demonstrate sub-
stantial heterogeneity across and within sectors,
and between ﬁrm size groups. Positive effects are
strongest in larger ﬁrms. While compatible with
possible pass-through and mark-up effects in
ﬁrms with more monopoly power (Wadsworth,
2010), the result may be taken to reﬂect more
sophisticated labour management practices
and high levels of NMW compliance (LeRoux,
Lucchino and Wilkinson, 2013) since ‘micro’
and small ﬁrms typically have fragmented and
reactive management practices (Cagliano, Black-
man and Voss, 2001). In theoretical terms, our
results support Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska’s
(2015) framework envisaging multiple channels
of adjustment to minimum wage impact; besides
the main wage incentives effect, we ﬁnd some
evidence of technological change and attrition as
potential sources of productivity improvements.
We thus position our model not as a replacement
for others, but as an alternative.
Our analysis has implications for managers who
may not have grasped potential productivity ben-
eﬁts (Luce, 2004). Similarly, small ﬁrm strategies
focused on staying ‘below the radar’ to avoid
NMW compliance may not always be appropriate.
We do not argue that employers should simply pay
a ‘living wage’ to raise employee incentives. This
would be simplistic since non-ﬁnancial factors also
count to low paid workers (Elfani, 2014). For na-
tional policy makers, we provide retrospective jus-
tiﬁcation for the upward trend in minimum wages
for the decade following inception.
Our results thus highlight a behavioural
perspective’s utility. Beyond implications for
management practice, our ﬁndings also speak to
contemporary wage policy discussions, not least
since ‘living wages’ may also enhance productivity.
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